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In contemporary western societies we have become 
used to thinking of the relation between “science” 
and “religion” (or between “faith” and “reason”) in 
disjunctive terms, assuming a necessary opposition 
and/or the overcoming of one of them by the other 
(science as an understanding of the world necessarily 
opposed to religious beliefs and practices, one 
which tends historically to overcome the latter in 
the progress of civilization). An example of this 
pervasive assumption is the widespread narrative 
that frequently appears in elementary and secondary 
school history programs regarding the Church’s 
persecution of Galileo and his final condemnation for 
heresy due to his pioneering scientific discoveries. 
Another perspective that was influential in forming 
this same pervasive assumption was the clear-cut 
Kantian separation between a theoretical use of 
reason —capable of yielding an objective, necessary 
and universal scientific knowledge of empirical 
phenomena expressed in the laws discovered by 
science, as distinct from the practical use of reason to 
guide us in how to live, beyond the limits of all positive 
knowledge of the world. This same conception was 
formulated later in the distinction drawn by Weber 
between the “facts” that social sciences are called on 
to describe objectively and the “value judgments” 
relegated to the subjective spheres of morality and 
religion. Without attempting to identify the precise 
historical origins of this widespread interpretation of 
a necessary opposition between science and religion, 
how would you, in your work as a historian of science 
/ as a theologian, submit it to a critical assessment 
and, hence, argue in favor of reconsidering this 
dominant conception of the relation between science 
and religion as an unbridgeable dichotomy?
Mauricio Nieto (MN): There certainly is a long and 
dominant historiographical tradition that has narrated 
the rise of modern science as a triumph of reason 
over faith, of experience over superstition, and one 
which assumes that western Europe is the cradle of a 
superior form of rational, objective, neutral, scientific 
knowledge in opposition to the beliefs of others and 
to religious dogmas in themselves. However, this 
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assumption, according to which a new and unique form 
of secular, rational, objective and neutral knowledge 
arose more or less spontaneously in some corner of 
western Europe is very difficult to sustain. The very 
idea of a “Scientific Revolution” has been severely 
questioned, and the search for a father, a place, or 
a historic moment to explain the origin of modern 
science has become increasingly difficult. There is 
abundant and very convincing literature in the history 
and the sociology of science that offers us a much more 
complex narrative today, and one of the key topics in 
recent debates on the history of science is precisely the 
question of its relation to religion.
Let us start with the obvious; the historical period and 
the protagonists of the traditional idea of a “Scientific 
Revolution” are all marked by a profound spirituality. 
The idea that the 16th and 17th centuries witnessed 
the consolidation of a new rational philosophy as 
opposed to faith and belief is unsustainable. The 
Iberian explorers of the New World, and figures like 
Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, Bacon, 
Descartes, all the heroes of that supposed scientific 
revolution, were profoundly religious and in most 
cases their works are rendered meaningless without 
their theological conceptions of the universe.
The case of Galileo is a good example of this idealized 
history of a revolutionary type of thought. His story 
shows those epic nuances of the free thinker who 
opposed the irrational obscurantism of the Church, 
but this is actually a dramatized history that is more in 
tune with the notions of 19th and 20th century science 
than with those of Renaissance Europe. The authority 
of a figure like Galileo, we know, was made possible in 
part due to his connections to both court and church. 
Of course there really were tensions and persecutions 
by the Inquisition with respect to the difficult ideas 
of Copernicanism, but to look for the fathers of a 
new philosophy that broke with all of ancient and 
medieval tradition in the 17th century is a task that 
is doomed to fail. A quick look at some of the names 
that are often linked to the birth of modern science 
make this difficulty evident. René Descartes is, for 
many, the father of rationalism or of mechanical 
philosophy and modern thought, but it is obvious 
that all of his philosophy sought a metaphysical and 
theological foundation. In the same light, we can 
see that the thinking of Boyle, Newton or any of the 
other great heroes of modern philosophy would be 
incomprehensible without the notion of God.
On the other hand, the idea of a radical epistemological 
rupture that was unique to the European Renaissance 
is equally problematic. It is evident that medieval 
philosophy, which has traditionally been considered 
a slave to religion, played a definitive role in what 
we understand as modern science today. To a great 
extent, the notion of modern science has to do with 
the consolidation of a new natural philosophy, a 
new cosmology and a new physics that broke away 
from Aristotelian paradigms, but what is not always 
evident is the fact that this distancing from the natural 
philosophy of Aristotle has its origins in Christian 
theology and its effort to consolidate a philosophical 
foundation for Christian dogma. Nor do I believe that it 
is possible to understand what we call modern science 
today without recognizing its relation to the Hermetic 
tradition, to magic, and to forms of Neoplatonism that 
sought to understand God through observation and the 
study, not only of his word —Sacred Scripture— but also 
of his work, Nature itself.
Western science and Christian theology, more than being 
two opposite, antagonistic, irreconcilable traditions, 
actually share both a past and very deep common bases. 
John Hedley Brooke (1991) has gathered together many of 
the complex interactions between science and religion 
from a historical perspective. Brooke as well as other 
historians of science have revised the common narrative 
of a conflict between a religious mentality and a scientific 
one, the former founded on faith, the latter grounded in 
verifiable facts and rigorous, rational methods. Today it is 
evident that the relations between theology and natural 
philosophy are complex and may even share fundamental 
elements. This is not the place to go into details about 
the complexity of these relations at different moments in 
the history of western philosophy, but it may be useful to 
remember that the very possibility of understanding the 
natural order and confiding in causal relations is based 
on the assumption of a theological concept of Nature in 
which the idea of design and, therefore, of a rational 
creator is a necessary condition for human knowledge of 
the natural order. Stephen Gaukroger (2006), from a much 
more philosophical perspective, convincingly shows us 
the theological roots of modern western philosophy. 
In most traditional histories of modern science and its 
great heroes like Johannes Kepler, Robert Boyle and Isaac 
Newton, little or no importance is given to the fact that all 
of them, with no exception, shared a common religious 
mentality, and their scientific and theological concerns 
cannot be separated. Furthermore, the idea of the more 
or less spontaneous birth of modern culture is usually 
explained as an achievement of the 17th century as if the 
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great philosophers of Christianity such as St. Augustine 
or St. Thomas do not form part of modern intellectual 
history, which is very questionable if we take into account 
the fact that modern philosophy in the western world is 
undeniably rooted in the scholastic tradition.
Franklin Gamwell (FG): The “unbridgeable dichotomy” 
to which this question refers is implied if science in 
relation to religion is equated with reason in relation 
to faith. On that equation, critical reasoning about 
the world is exhausted by science, so that religious 
convictions can only be “matters of faith,” meaning 
thereby beliefs immune to critical or rational validation 
or invalidation. I am here assuming that science is 
disciplined empirical inquiry, that is, a pursuit of 
knowledge about certain contingent facts, and thus 
all scientific statements can be denied without self-
contradiction. If critical reflection about the world is 
exhausted by such inquiry, all conditions of existence 
are contingent, and no statement that asserts any 
such condition is necessarily true. Science and religion 
then constitute an unbridgeable dichotomy because 
religions include beliefs about the proper ends and 
thus the worth of human life in general or as such, and 
contingent facts never imply anything about the good 
in human life. Any such supposed implication commits 
what has come to be called the naturalistic fallacy. 
Given solely contingent conditions of existence, then, 
no assertion about worth or the good to be realized can 
be validated without positing a prior such assertion 
in need of validation. Hence, all such assertions are 
dogmatic, immune to critical or rational assessment.
That all meaningful statements about the world are 
logically contingent is, I am persuaded, essential to 
secularism in all of its expressions and widely affirmed 
in contemporary western thought. Nonetheless, some 
secularists —for instance, Kant and some Kantians— 
hold that moral as well as scientific assertions are 
objects of rational assessment. On this basis, moreover, 
Kant himself advanced a solely practical interpretation 
of religion that purports to be independent of any 
statement about conditions of existence. If all such 
conditions are contingent, however, I doubt that any 
supposedly rational account of morality can succeed. 
As far as I can see, all moral theories at least implicitly 
affirm, even if some explicitly deny doing so, an end 
or state or affairs to be maximized or pursued, so that 
purposes in their entirety ought to be directed to it. 
Hence, given the secularistic premise about existence, 
evaluation cannot escape the need always to posit a 
prior evaluation assertion.
On that analysis, secularism reduces practical reason to 
instrumental thought in service to ends nonrationally 
chosen. One thinker has called this the modern 
“complementarity system of value-free rationality 
and pre-rational value decisions” (Apel 1979, 38). Facts 
can be public, and values are inherently private, and 
religion includes entirely general statements about 
what is entirely private. David Hume and Max Weber 
then command the field. Still, I will not defend this 
reading of secularism —and, instead, will assume it 
and note the following: that the world is exhausted by 
the kind of facts science seeks to discover cannot itself 
be one of those facts. That all conditions of existence 
are contingent cannot itself be a contingent condition 
of existence; it can only be a necessary condition of 
all things, such that assertion of it cannot be denied 
without self-contradiction.
Even then, one might endorse this necessity by insisting 
that “nothing exists,” meaning the complete absence 
of everything, is itself logically possible, whereby 
the presence of anything at all is indeed necessarily 
contingent. But that insistence is especially difficult 
to defend, and I hold that “nothing exists” or “there 
might have been sheer nothing” is itself logically 
impossible or nonsensical —because it cannot be 
distinguished from a putative statement (for instance, 
a self-contradictory statement) that says nothing at 
all. Again, I will not pursue this argument, but if the 
conclusion is correct, “something exists” is a logically 
necessary statement, and reasoning about the world 
includes the metaphysical project. Here, metaphysics 
is critical reflection that seeks to clarify the necessary 
conditions of existence, that is, to explicate the 
implications of “something exists.” A true metaphysics 
explicates ultimate reality, the ultimate nature of 
things —and provides the terms in which the relation 
between science and religion may be reconceived.
Given necessary conditions of existence, all human life 
includes an experience of them; what is necessarily 
present is always present in human experience, 
characterizing the past we inherit, the present, and 
the future about which we decide. We may, then, 
define religion in terms of the abiding human relation 
to ultimate reality. That relation defines the ultimate 
worth of human life because, summarily stated, 
decision with understanding necessarily compares its 
alternatives for purpose with respect to choosing, thereby 
evaluating them, and the fallacy of so comparing them 
in terms of some logically contingent understanding 
of existence is no longer in force. In other words, 
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metaphysical conditions define or include a good given 
in the ultimate nature of things and whose realization 
human decisions are bound to maximize.
On my accounting, religions are not themselves 
metaphysical proposals. To the contrary, a religion 
is a cultural formation of concepts and symbols, 
including symbolic practices, in which some belief 
about human life in relation to ultimate reality is so 
represented explicitly that adherents of the religion 
may, by focusing on it, cultivate expression of that 
belief in all of their activity. The function of religion, 
we can say, is to mediate an existential understanding 
of ourselves in relation to the entirety of which we are 
parts. But if not themselves metaphysical proposals, 
religions imply a set of metaphysical claims, precisely 
because the understanding a religion seeks to mediate 
concerns one’s relation to ultimate reality. In that way, 
each religion attempts to make explicit what is always 
present in the experience of all humans.
For this reason, religions are not “matters of faith” if 
that term means a belief immune to rational validation 
or invalidation. Each religion may indeed be called a 
faith because its function is to cultivate an existential 
understanding of our ultimate worth. But every 
religious representation can be critically assessed by 
formulating its metaphysical and moral implications 
and asking whether they accord with the inescapable 
human relation to ultimate reality. Critical thought of 
this kind, Iris Murdoch once wrote, is “determined to 
argue for something it already knows” (Murdoch 1993, 
435). Religious convictions can themselves be rationally 
validated and invalidated because they seek to make 
explicit something in human experience implied by 
every human belief and activity —and from religion 
so understood, an alternative view of its relation to 
science follows.
Metaphysical conditions not only make possible the 
ultimate worth of human life but also constitute the 
abiding aspect of the world empirical science investigates. 
Such conditions are common to subjects who decide, on 
the one hand, and to the objects of science, on the other. 
Moreover, science is an activity of subjects and, like 
all of our activities, is something we decide to pursue 
because we affirm it as worthy. Accordingly, science is 
properly ordered by the truth about our ultimate worth 
each religion seeks explicitly to represent. This in no 
way denies that many facts —indeed, all facts about 
the world except those at the very highest or necessary 
level of abstraction— are contingent, and therefore the 
scientific method, proper to critical reasoning about 
some contingent facts, is autonomous within the realm 
to which it applies. Nor does this account in any way 
imply that science should be controlled by any specific 
practical purpose or particular religious community 
or tradition. The point is simply this: our true relation 
to ultimate reality, whose critical explication includes 
a true metaphysics, is the reason for the scientific 
enterprise, thereby setting the proper terms for defining 
the scientific method and for conceiving the relation of 
religion and science.
The dichotomy described in the previous question 
presupposes a set of epistemological claims that have 
political implications, in terms of enabling some 
and disabling other possibilities for thinking, acting 
and judging the social order in which we live and 
the historical becoming through which it has been 
constituted. For example, the presumed epistemic 
superiority of the language of modern sciences over 
the language of mythological or religious discourses as 
grids for making the world and the human condition 
intelligible is an integral part of how the political 
history of the encounters between modern western 
nation-states and their colonized “others” is narrated. 
Or, to offer another example, this alleged epistemic 
superiority easily leads to a secularistic conception 
of political agency as a history-constituting and 
history-transforming power, widely dominant in 
the context of modern societies. This conception 
does not allow us to understand and think through 
the ways in which religious discourses and practices 
have been decisive in forming significant practices of 
political resistance like the civil rights movement in 
the United States. A set of epistemological claims can 
profoundly condition the ontology of the social world 
of which we consider ourselves to be a part, silencing 
other ways of understanding history and the type 
of agency that can configure it, or transform it. In 
the trajectory of your work, how do you understand 
the relation between epistemology and politics (or 
between epistemological and political problems), in 
connection to the science-religion dyad of which we 
have been speaking? Or to put it somewhat differently, 
what are the implications in our understanding of 
the political that derive from the way we assume a 
set of epistemological claims to draw the distinction 
between science and religion in a certain way?
MN: Nothing is more powerful than Truth and that 
is a common element in both science and religion. 
Authority, order and dominion have to do with the 
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existence of subjects with the authority to speak for 
others. The very idea of Truth eliminates any possibility 
of debate or of public participation; it is contrary to 
opinion or diversity. Once Truth and its spokesmen 
arrive, the public arena is left vacant; it is, so to speak, 
the end of politics.
We could argue that the main concern of current social 
studies of science (among historians, philosophers, 
and sociologists of knowledge) is the problem of power, 
of how the relations between knowledge and politics 
are formed. Thus, the relation between epistemology 
and politics is total. The great problem of power, 
from the viewpoint of a historian of science, has to 
do with understanding how the spokesmen of Truth 
are constituted, that is to say individuals, or better 
yet, social groups, that have the authority to speak 
for everyone else. The birth of modern science and the 
European Enlightenment are fundamentally changes 
in political history; it is, once again, the battle for 
Truth. Who has the truth about nature, about the 
human body, about society, about economics and, of 
course, about eternity… it is a powerful agent in the 
constitution of order, both social and natural. It is in 
this sense that we cannot understand politics outside of 
the religious or scientific spheres.
Let’s think about the great historical processes of, 
for example, the empires of Christian Europe and 
their conquest of much of the planet, which has been 
justified precisely by the idea of Christian Europe as the 
bearer of religious and scientific truths. The discovery 
and conquest of America were motivated and justified 
by the propagation of Christian dogma; the domination 
as well as the extermination of other cultures were 
carried out in the name of God, of a truth that had to 
be spread or imposed for the good of humankind. The 
manifestation of cultural or scientific superiority that 
imposed western European ways of understanding, 
ordering and operating on nature and society was not 
very different.
It might be worthwhile clarifying here that the 
relations between science and politics should not 
be understood as the interaction between distinct 
spheres or as instrumental relations in which science 
is influenced by or operates in the name of politics; 
it is more a question of understanding science as 
politics. It is not a matter, for example, of explaining 
science within the context of imperial history, but 
rather as imperial history. In fact, it is practices such 
as geography, natural history, medicine, economics, 
forms of power in action, practices that shape new 
natural and social orders and simultaneously shape 
practices that constitute the subjects that define said 
orders. A similar reflection should be made regarding 
religion and politics, thinking not so much of religion 
at the service of politics, as an instrument of power, but 
rather of religion as politics and as power.
FG: On my accounting, the supposed dichotomy 
between science and religion follows from the 
secularistic assumption that all conditions of 
existence are contingent. On the correlative account 
of epistemology, both morality and religion involve 
nonrational beliefs, and practical reason is reduced to 
its instrumental service toward ends humans are left 
merely to decide or posit. This reading takes issue with 
those for whom a secularistic morality can be rational, 
but I also expressed doubt that any such proposal can 
succeed. To the best of my reasoning, human decision 
as such chooses among alternatives for purpose, and 
every moral theory at least implies an understanding of 
worth or the good that properly directs purposes in their 
entirety —and no such understanding can be validated 
if all conditions of existence are contingent.
Given the reductive account of practical reason, the 
consequences for political life are considerable. If 
human ends are nonrational, human association 
is properly seen as the interaction of strategically 
concerned individuals or groups, each relating to the 
others in terms of its own private purposes. Political 
life is reduced to the accidental conflict and concord 
of private interests and thus, unless violence or war 
results, to bargaining negotiations. The model for 
such interaction is the concept of economic exchange, 
where each party calculates benefits in terms of its 
preferences in order to reach an agreement. In sum, the 
rationalization of society is rightly captured in Weber’s 
description of modernity, and something similar 
characterizes the interaction among nations.
To be sure, modern western political theories have 
often purported to be democratic. Procedures of fair 
interaction, sometimes including principles for a 
distribution of resources in accord with some account 
of equal opportunity, are said to provide the context 
within which nonrational interests or purposes are 
acceptable —and norms for international relations are 
sometimes derived from these democratic proposals. 
Liberalism in political thought is often said to be 
the consequence, and many theories of this kind 
imply dominance within the social order of economic 
Revista de Estudios Sociales No. 51 • rev.estud.soc. • Pp. 300.
ISSN 0123-885X • Bogotá, enero - marzo de 2015 • Pp. 258-266.
262
institutions and goals —precisely because they are 
thought to provide all-purpose means to diverse private 
ends. But secularism as described above prevents, 
I believe, any democratic principles of justice all 
citizens have reason to consider prescriptive. What 
counts for individuals and groups as good relations to 
other people will depend on what is affirmed as the 
inclusive good that action should pursue —and if, in 
each case, the latter is nonrational, rational norms for 
politics cannot be derived.
This reading of secularistic democratic theories 
is confirmed by their attempts to interpret the 
constitutional principle of religious freedom. Given 
constitutional legitimization of, and thus governmental 
neutrality toward, diverse religious convictions (or, 
more extensively, what John Rawls calls comprehensive 
doctrines), how is principled common action and 
thus political community possible? The pluralism in 
question, virtually all agree, involves convictions about 
the overall or inclusive orientation of human life, and 
secularistic theories of religious freedom typically 
propose to separate public reason or democratic 
principles from any one of these orientations. Such 
independence is thought to be required because the 
convictions legitimized at least include religious beliefs, 
and they are assumed to be nonrational “matters of 
faith.” Hence, principled neutrality toward the entire 
class entails separation from any member thereof.
As far as I can see, however, this solution is untenable. 
Each conviction about the inclusive orientation of 
human life implies that all principles of justice depend 
on it, and relevant disagreement among religions 
or comprehensive doctrines is a conflict at the most 
fundamental level of political evaluation. A proposal 
in which justice is separated from any one is, then, a 
denial of all of them —or, what comes to the same thing, 
a competitive assertion about the most fundamental 
character of justice. Because the beliefs religious 
freedom legitimizes are said to be nonrational, the 
principled separation that governmental neutrality is 
said to require must be constitutionally stipulated — and 
thereby the constitution contradicts itself, explicitly 
denying the convictions it also protects. In truth, a 
legitimized plurality of nonrational convictions about 
justice as such cannot be civilized; the only alternatives 
are a modus vivendi or a fight.
If secularistic epistemology makes religious freedom 
incoherent, the alternative opened by the metaphysical 
project entails an alternative account of democracy. 
Differing religions are now understood as differing 
attempts to explicate our common human experience 
of ultimate reality and our ultimate worth. Thereby, 
all convictions about the inclusive orientation of our 
activities can be critically assessed as valid or invalid 
—and the principle of religious freedom is no longer 
inconsistent with political community: a legitimate 
diversity of beliefs about the fundamental terms of 
political evaluation can be civilized through a full and 
free political discourse. To be sure, activities of the 
state informed by this discourse cannot be independent 
of all such beliefs but, rather, will imply some or 
other fundamental terms of justice —namely, those 
the discourse of the relevant majority of democratic 
citizens, at least at a given time, finds convincing. 
But those activities may still be explicitly neutral to the 
diversity if the government is always prohibited from 
teaching anything about the religion or comprehensive 
doctrine any activity of the state does or does not imply.
Focus on the coherence of religious freedom is a 
window on the political consequences of an adequate 
metaphysics. Given that convictions about worth in 
human life as such are properly objects of rational 
assessment, political life is not interaction among and 
for the sake of private interests or ends but, rather, is 
properly directed by a common human vocation we 
all find in our experience. Democracy constitutes a 
full and free discussion and debate seeking to clarify 
that vocation and apply it to activities of the state. A 
secularistic account of liberal politics then becomes one 
more proposal about our relation to ultimate reality —
and is, moreover, pragmatically self-refuting because it 
asserts the nonrational character of such proposals.
I will, then, simply assert my own neoclassical 
convictions about the necessary conditions of 
existence: the metaphysically fundamental things 
are social in character. Each is a present event defined 
by its internal relations to events of the past and its 
decision how to condition the future, and worth or 
the good is defined by the creativity made possible 
by those relations and achieved by unifying them for 
the sake of subsequent events. The implication for 
morality, I will also simply assert, is a comprehensive 
purpose prescribing, with due attention to value in the 
nonhuman world, unification or activity in pursuit 
of maximal human sociality, a common world of 
human achievements I will call our maximal common 
humanity —so that all humans flourish because each 
is empowered insofar as possible by relations to all of 
the others. Political purpose, then, properly seeks to 
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provide or promote the general conditions required 
to maximize this common humanity —even if that 
principle of public purpose should only be implied 
by activities of the state and is properly explicit only 
in the political discourse. I recognize the terse and, 
perhaps, cryptic nature of this formulation. But its 
intent is simply to underscore by illustration how the 
rational character of religious convictions and their 
metaphysical implications entails a conception of 
politics as itself properly directed by an ideal —which 
is, given neoclassical metaphysics, humanitarian —
ever-present in the experience of us all.
From the perspective of your field of academic 
research (as a historian of science / as a theologian), 
is it possible, and if so how, to reflect upon a divine 
agency in the eventfulness of historical and social 
realities or processes (for instance, in the way it is 
performed by political actors directly implied in these 
processes)? And why would it be important, if it is, 
from the perspective of your academic work, to resist 
the stigma of “irrationality” that constantly threatens 
to invalidate or silence a reflection of this type?
MN: In his book The Personal God, Ulrich Beck says with 
good reason: “We carry the language of secularism in 
our blood,” and presents us with the enormous difficulty 
that sociology encounters in dealing with the subject 
of religious experiences. We could say that true heresy 
for the world of modern science is the incorporation 
of agency or divine forces into history; that is to say, 
we can see an evident failure of the social sciences in 
their explanation of the spiritual. The religious sphere 
presents a challenge, a notable difficulty for the social 
sciences, which are essentially secular. Are there any 
alternatives for understanding the spiritual with respect 
to secularization? Let us start by recalling that it has 
not always been this way. In the writings and historical 
explanations of 16th century Christian chroniclers, we 
find that God, the saints, the Virgin Mary, and demons 
all played definitive roles in history. Their version of 
history is explicitly providential, and the cause of what 
happens in history is the will of God. Nonetheless, a long 
and dominant historiographical tradition has reduced the 
religious to the level of irrational beliefs. This reduction 
of the religious to false beliefs eventually reduces the 
religious to the realm of rhetoric or representation. Thus, 
in its relation to great historical processes such as the 
conquest of America, the religious or the spiritual appears 
in modern historiography as merely accessory factors, 
subordinated to “more real” factors such as economics, 
trade, or politics, which are considered the true agents 
of history. However, I do not believe it is possible to 
understand the history of the expansion of Christianity in 
the 16th century, for example, if we leave aside religious 
experience, or even the power of God. The sources to 
which we have access in our efforts to understand the 16th 
century make it evident that human actions and historic 
events were carried out in the name of God.
I believe that there are different options to explore with 
respect to this problem. Within the framework of Social 
Studies of Science, a certain theoretical proposal has 
gained importance which I believe could offer interesting 
alternatives. Bruno Latour, John Law, Michael Callon, 
among others, most likely tired of the very generalized 
social explanation of scientific knowledge, wanted to 
incorporate the agency of non-human actors into their 
historical explanations. In the final decades of the 20th 
century, the expression “social construction” of this and that 
was used very frequently, and reality itself was presented as 
a social construct, thus giving the impression that sociology 
could explain everything. This position is based on a major 
and problematic assumption, which is that society is less 
complex than the natural world, and given this difficulty, 
the interesting proposal of incorporating non-human 
agents into historical explanations has appeared in 
sociology, which has been denominated the Actor Network 
Theory (ANT). This is not the time to go into detail about 
the work of this school of sociologists; the point is not only 
to consider their call to incorporate the agency of artifacts 
or natural entities in the conformation of networks 
that will make it possible to understand the history of 
scientific theories and technological practices, but to 
extend this notion of agency of the non-human to divine 
“actors” as well. I do not know of any proposals from this 
perspective to refer to “divine agents,” but neither do I see 
any reason to exclude them. Finally, we must remember 
that the role of actors in terms of networks is explained as 
a result of the interaction among heterogeneous agents. 
The actors do not operate, which means they do not 
exist outside of these interactions; they do not precede 
the networks, but are instead a product of them. In this 
order of ideas, both a saint and a demon possess “agency” 
to the extent that they interact with humans and with 
nature, and I see no reason not to recognize their power. 
This historic recognition of divine power assumes neither 
that we will become mystic sociologists nor believers 
in religious doctrines. It is rather a matter of a secular 
sociology capable of incorporating the agency of the non-
human. It is possible that not too many concessions will 
be required of contemporary social sciences to recognize 
the agency of artifacts, of the printing press on modern 
culture, of the ships and navigation instruments used 
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in Europe’s conquest of the seas; it is equally plausible 
to invoke geographical, biological or physical aspects in 
history. It is widely accepted today that the European 
conquest of America would be difficult to explain without 
considering biological factors such as the role of European 
diseases and the effects they had on the vulnerable 
immune systems of the native population. What would 
have become of Columbus’ adventure or enterprise 
without the winds and ocean currents of the Atlantic?
However, the inclusion of saints, demons or gods in 
modern history is much more difficult to accept. The 
tone of the Christian chroniclers sounds both strange 
and inadequate to us, as does the reason they give for the 
historic events of the 16th century. Is this an absurd way 
of explaining the Christian history of the 16th century? Is 
it not evident that human actions had and in many cases 
still continue to have spiritual motivations? Is God not the 
most powerful of all actors in the history of the expansion 
of Christianity, a God in whose name monarchs, soldiers, 
priests, captains and sailors all acted?
FG: If ultimate reality is present to us all, and 
neoclassical metaphysics rightly defines the good, a 
divine individual is, I believe, implied. Here, God is 
conceived as that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-
thought. Given a social purpose in the ultimate nature 
of things, the greatest possible individual must be the 
eminently temporal whole of reality, whose sociality 
presently unifies in all of its detail all that has ever 
occurred and whose future moments will always add 
in all of their detail new occurrences as they become 
present. One way to explicate the implication of deity 
is the following: worldly decision for maximal good 
inescapably seeks its realization in a future multiplicity 
of events, for instance, in the creative achievements of 
human persons; but this maximizing makes no sense 
unless the many realizations pursued are somehow 
summated or unified. Moreover, the unification must 
be concrete because the realizations pursued —for 
instance, the human achievements— will be concrete. 
A temporal individual each of whose presents is the 
concrete whole of strictly all reality is required.
On this account, the ultimate worth of our lives is nothing 
other than the difference they make to God, whose 
sociality is itself maximized when we seek the greatest 
good for the worldly future. Further, the worth is ultimate 
because inclusion of our deeds and their worldly effects 
within the divine is everlasting, whereby they “make a 
difference which no turn of events in the future has the 
power to annul” (Ogden 1996, 36). As far as I can see, we 
all affirm this permanent worth whenever we decide with 
understanding. The supposed thought that what we do 
will eventually be worthless, canceled by the sands of time, 
is something no human can really believe. Evaluation 
of our alternatives is, in truth, all things considered —
and eventual nullity is a meaningless consideration for 
practical reason. If nothing ultimate is at stake in what we 
do, then ultimately nothing is at stake.
Given that reason commends fundamental terms of 
political evaluation dependent on metaphysical theism, 
common human experience includes an experience 
of God. But this in no way implies what has often 
been asserted as “a divine agency in the eventfulness 
of historical and social realities.” At least on many 
formulations, God is a completely eternal absolute that 
chose to create a completely contingent world and has 
the power to intervene by choice in worldly affairs. In 
our social and political life, then, special events may 
interrupt the course of human or natural causality 
because eternity for its own purposes then and there 
breaks into worldly history —and, correspondingly, we 
may petition for such special activity.
That conception bears the “stigma of irrationality” 
because the character of this eternity cannot be 
present in common human experience and thus 
cannot be established by critical reasoning. As is often 
acknowledged by advocates of this idea, it defines 
God literally by complete negation of all worldly 
characteristics (for instance, temporality, contingency, 
or dependence), and all positive characterization of God 
must be mythical or symbolic. Accordingly, the divine 
character must be suprarational and thus known only 
through its special disclosure or revelation. This all 
too pervasive notion of the transcendent reality has 
played its part in confirming the secularistic view of 
science and religion —that is, a world in all respects 
contingent, such that critical inquiry about it is 
exhausted by science, and religious belief is immune to 
reasoned assessment.
Against that notion, the affirmation of metaphysical 
sociality implies the necessity of some or other world as 
well as the necessity of God. An eminently social whole 
of reality depends on nondivine realities; a worldly 
class with some or other members must also exist, even 
while each one exists contingently because it relates to 
others fragmentarily. Among individuals, the divine 
alone exists necessarily, always unifying the whole 
completely. Only as this all-inclusive reality, if I see the 
matter rightly, can God’s character be ever-present in 
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the entire world —so that science is properly ordered 
and politics properly directed by the abiding relation to 
ultimate reality religions seek explicitly to represent.
It remains that God’s agency is essential to our life 
together —not through special divine interventions 
within history but, rather, through the divine purpose 
present in common human experience. Because the 
future of human affairs and, indeed, of the whole world 
is also the future of the deity who alone gives ultimate 
worth to human life, we have a common affection for 
the humanitarian ideal, and divine agency is essential 
to the presence of this telos in every person and in our 
common life, giving point to politics itself. The truth 
about our lives attaches us, we may say, to the beloved 
community because we are attached to its God. ➻
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